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RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES UNDER THE
WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION
Abstract In 1986 the Washington Supreme Court set forth six criteria for courts to
apply in determining whether the state constitution affords broader protection for civil
liberties than the federal Constitution. While making progress toward an independent
interpretation of the state constitution, Washington courts remain overly dependent on
federal precedent. This Comment explores Washington's approach to independent analy-
sis of the state constitution by examining a recent Washington case extending a privacy
interest to an individual's garbage. Washington's approach needs to be modified to
emphasize independent analysis of the state constitution and thereby give effect to Wash-
ington's unique and vital constitutional heritage.
When should a Washington state court deviate from federal consti-
tutional precedent and independently interpret similar provisions in
the state constitution? In our federal system, state courts have the
right to offer greater civil liberties protection under state constitutions
than under the federal Constitution.1 Recently, for example, the
Washington State Supreme Court departed from the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of fourth amendment search and
seizure rights. The Washington Supreme Court in State v. Boland2
found a state constitutional right to privacy in a person's garbage,
although the United States Supreme Court had held under the federal
Constitution that the fourth amendment does not prohibit search and
seizure of a person's garbage.'
This Comment examines the current status of independent state
constitutional analysis in Washington, focusing on the growth and
expansion of state constitutional law protecting privacy interests with
respect to search and seizure. This overview will demonstrate that
undue reliance on the federal Constitution and on federal precedent
has hampered development of Washington state constitutional protec-
tions. This Comment suggests that Washington courts should exercise
care to keep the role of the federal Constitution in perspective and
should concentrate more on Washington's own unique and vital con-
stitution. This policy will better protect the civil liberties due Wash-
ington citizens.
1. See infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
2. 115 Wash. 2d 571, 800 P.2d 1112 (1990).
3. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988).
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I. THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION
A. Significant Differences Between the State Constitution and the
Federal Constitution
Structural, textual, and historical differences distinguish the federal
Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Washington4 . Exam-
ination of these differences reveals that in several areas the Washing-
ton State Constitution provides greater protection for civil liberties.
Further, elements of the state constitution direct attention not to the
federal Constitution for protection of civil liberties, but to rights as
embodied in the Washington State Constitution.
1. Structural Differences
The Washington State Constitution independently provides protec-
tion for civil liberties and emphasizes these individual liberties struc-
turally. The state constitution begins with a "Declaration of Rights,"
which asserts at the outset that governments "are established to pro-
tect and maintain individual rights."5  Following this statement
regarding the importance of individual liberty, the Declaration sets
forth rights analogous to those in the federal Bill of Rights as well as
additional rights not included in the federal Constitution.' Finally,
article I, section 32 of the Washington State Constitution reiterates the
natural rights embodied in the Washington Declaration of Rights by
noting that "a recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the
security of individual right and the perpetuity of free government." 7
In contrast, the federal Constitution focuses on the structural
framework of government and includes individual rights in amend-
ments.' Arguably, the structure of government was of primary con-
cern when the federal Constitution was written in the 18th century,
but individual rights dominated in 1889 when the Washington State
Constitution was drafted. The decision of the Washington State Con-
stitution authors to begin their document with a clarification of rights
4. This Comment uses the terms "Washington State Constitution" and "state constitution" to
refer to the Constitution of the State of Washington.
5. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 1.
6. See WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 1-34; see also infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
7. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 32. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
8. Except for a few liberties enumerated in the text of the federal Constitution such as the
contracts clause ("No state shall [pass] any [law] impairing the Obligation of Contracts" U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.), individual liberties are set fourth in the Bill of Rights. U.S. CONST.,
amends. 1-10.
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retained by the people suggests the supreme importance the authors
attached to the Declaration of Rights.'
Several sections of the Washington State Constitution require the
state to provide for certain fundamental needs.,O For instance, article
IX compels the state to furnish education for all children. 1 Similarly,
article XIII states that reform facilities and services for the disabled
"shall be fostered and supported by the state."' 2 The federal Constitu-
tion contains no such mandates. In fact, the United States Supreme
Court recently found no federal constitutional obligation whatsoever
for states to act affirmatively in order to protect constitutional rights.13
Instead, Congress and the states have the duty to ensure through legis-
lation that rights enumerated in the federal Constitution are pro-
tected. 4 The role of the state constitution in Washington, however, is
not only to guarantee basic rights, but to ensure that the state affirma-
tively acts to provide for basic societal needs such as education. Pro-
viding for such needs fosters protection of civil liberties. 5
Structurally, therefore, the Washington State Constitution emphasizes
protection of individual liberties to a greater extent than does the fed-
eral Constitution.
2. Textual Differences
Textual differences also distinguish the state and federal constitu-
tions. For example, the counterpart to federal fourth amendment
rights is found in article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitu-
tion. 6 Although analogous to the federal guarantee, the state provi-
sion uses strikingly different language. Whereas the fourth
9. WASH. CONST. art. I.
10. The term "needs" as used in this Comment is distinct from "rights" only in that services
such as education can be viewed as vital services rather than as natural rights. However, the
distinction is lost where compelled by a constitution; both become entitlements guaranteed by the
state.
11. WASH. CoNsT. art. IX, § 1. ("It is the paramount duty of the state to make ample
provision for the education of all children residing within its borders, without distinction or
preference on account of race, color, caste, or sex.")
12. WASH. CONST. art. XIII, § 1.
13. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (no
constitutional obligation for a county social worker to affirmatively protect a child for whom the
county had assumed responsibility). But see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (the federal
Constitution may require a state to provide benefits in order to provide equal protection of the
laws).
14. See, eg. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648 (1966) (Congress may act to provide
remedies for potential violations of the Constitution).
15. See infra text accompanying note 106.
16. WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 7. Free speech provisions under WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5 are
also distinct. See infra note 22.
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amendment provides for protection from unreasonable search and
seizure, 7 the Washington State Constitution speaks of a person's "pri-
vate affairs.""8 The Washington Supreme Court recognizes that this is
not a superficial difference. The federal test for protection under the
fourth amendment turns on whether a "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy" exists,' 9 but in Washington the focus is on unreasonable intru-
sion into a person's "private affairs." 2 Courts interpret the state
provision to provide broader protection than that afforded by the fed-
eral Constitution.2
Privacy protections are not the sole textual difference between the
two constitutions.22 In addition to providing broader protection in
parallel provisions, the Washington Declaration of Rights contains
provisions not specifically found in the federal Constitution. For
example, the Washington State Constitution forbids imprisonment for
debt,23 explicitly makes military power subordinate to civil author-
ity,24 provides for free elections,25 and allows individuals the right to
bear arms in order to protect themselves as well as to protect the
state.26 These provisions of the state constitution are mandatory,27
indicating that the liberties guaranteed in Washington's Declaration of
Rights are broader than those protected by the Bill of Rights.
3. Differences in Framers' Intent
The fact that a given provision is textually distinct does not ensure
that it is substantively different. For instance, a state court may inter-
17. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
18. "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without
authority of law." WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
19. The "reasonable expectation" test is attributed to Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
20. State v. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 575, 800 P.2d 1112, 1114 (1990).
21. See, e.g., State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984); State v. White, 97
Wash. 2d 92, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982); State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980).
22. The free speech guarantee of the Washington State Con-titution is also textually distinct:
"Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse
of that right." WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5. The Washington Supreme Court "construed this
state's constitutional free speech provision to afford greater protection of individual liberties than
its federal counterpart." Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic Policy Comm., 113
Wash. 2d 413, 421, 780 P.2d 1282, 1286 (1989) (citing O'Day v. King County, 109 Wash. 2d 796,
802, 749 P.2d 142 (1988); Bering v. Share, 106 Wash. 2d 212, 234, 721 P.2d 918 (1986), cert.
dismissed, 479 U.S. 1050, (1987); State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 364, 679 P.2d 353 (1984)).
23. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 17.
24. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 18. Admittedly, this is implicit in the federal Constitution.
25. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 19.
26. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 24.
27. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 29.
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pret language differing from the federal Constitution as providing pro-
tection equal to the federal Constitution.28 In Washington, however,
historical evidence suggests that the framers purposely chose distinct
wording to protect against intrusion on individual rights to a greater
extent than provided by the federal Constitution.29 An early draft of
Washington's free speech clause resembled the federal version, but the
framers rejected it in order to expand free speech in Washington.30
Similarly, the framers rejected a preliminary version of section 7 iden-
tical to the fourth amendment in favor of the broader current word-
ing.31 These examples demonstrate the intent of the framers of the
Washington State Constitution to protect individual liberties with the
state document.
B. The Role of the Washington State Constitution Under American
Federalism
Federalism allows Washington state courts to interpret the state
constitution as protecting civil liberties beyond the level of federal con-
stitutional protection. 2 Interest in state constitutions as a source of
protection for civil liberties began in earnest during the 1970s when
the Burger Court instigated a period of federal civil rights retrench-
ment.33 Justice Brennan was an early and vocal advocate of state con-
stitutional analysis,3 4 and the United States Supreme Court recognized
that states can expand civil liberties beyond the federally guaranteed
level.35 Only three restrictions on independent state constitutional
28. The Washington Supreme Court has in fact interpreted Washington's free speech clause,
article I, section 5, as conferring protection identical to the first amendment to the federal
Constitution with respect to obscenity, even though the language differs considerably. State v.
Reece, 110 Wash. 2d 766, 776, 757 P. 2d 947, 953 (1988).
29. See, eg., Utter, The Right to Speak, Write, and Publish Freely: State Constitutional
Protection Against Private Abridgment, 8 U. PUGET SOuND L. Rnv. 157, 178-80 (1985).
30. Id. at 172-77.
31. The Journal of the Washington Constitutional Convention, 1889 at 497 (B. Rosenow ed.
1962).
32. See generally Collins, Foreward: Reliance on State Constitutions--Beyond the New
Federalism, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. vi, vi-viii (1985) (foreward to volume dedicated to
symposium on Washington constitutional law).
33. See eg., Teachout, Against the Stream: An Introduction to the Vermont Law Review
Symposium on State Constitutional Law, 13 VT. L. Rav. 13, 13-16 (1988).
34. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 489 (1977). Justice Brennan wrote, "state courts cannot rest when they have afforded their
citizens the full protections of the federal Constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of
individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme
Court's interpretation of federal law." Id at 491.
35. See, e-g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975). Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority
stated, "a State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity
1103
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analysis exist. First, the degree of protection provided by a state con-
stitution must not fall below the level guaranteed by the federal Con-
stitution.3 6 Second, a state court relying on the state constitution must
indicate specifically that its decision is based on independent state
grounds; if the state constitutional basis is not clearly and expressly
identified, the United States Supreme Court can review and possibly
overturn the decision as an erroneous interpretation of federal stan-
dards.37 Finally, the state guarantee cannot intrude upon a separate
federal constitutional right.38
C. Washington's Approach to Independent State Constitutional
Analysis: State v. Gunwall
Washington's early advances into independent state constitutional
analysis implicitly deferred to federal constitutional analysis.3 9 In
1986, however, Washington's highest court attempted to add legal
substance and direction to independent state constitutional analysis in
State v. Gunwall.4°  The issue in Gunwall was whether the police
could, without a warrant, obtain a record of local and long distance
numbers dialed.41 The United States Supreme Court previously held
that such warrantless conduct was not a constitutional violation,4 2 so
analysis in Gunwall turned on whether such police action comported
with the state constitution. The court set forth six "non-exclusive cri-
teria"43 to be applied when considering whether the Washington State
Constitution extends broader protection than the federal Constitution:
(1) the textual language; (2) differences in the texts; (3) constitutional
than those this Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards." Id. at 719
(emphasis in original).
36. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041-42 (1983); Pruneyard Shopping Center
v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975).
37. Michigan, 463 U.S. at 1041.
38. For example, a state requirement to provide assistance to parochial schools would offend
the federal establishment clause. See U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
39. See, e.g., Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 238, 635
P.2d 108, 113 (1981) ("Where controlling federal principles have not changed with the evolution
of our society or where they have been recently overruled by the United States Supreme Court,
our constitution has been applied.").
40. 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986); see also Note, Federalism, Uniformity and the
State Constitution-State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986), 62 WASH. L. REv.
569 (1987).
41. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d 54, 58, 720 P.2d 808, 810-11 (1986).
42. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
43. "Non-exclusive" in the sense that not all elements need be met in order to move beyond
federal precedent, and other factors may be incorporated into the analysis.
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history; (4) preexisting state law; (5) structural differences; (6) matters
of particular state interest or local concern.44
The Gunwall decision intended to provide for independent analysis
of the Washington State Constitution. Justice Andersen, writing for
the majority, set forth two ambitious goals. First, the Gunwall court
designed the six criteria to aid counsel in asserting constitutional
grounds.45 Second, the criteria were intended to ensure that state con-
stitutional analysis would develop in a principled manner based on
"well-founded legal reasons" rather than through ad hoc decisions
where the court's opinion of justice differs from that of the United
States Supreme Court.' In effect, the court intended constitutional
analysis in Washington to be a two-stage process. First, if properly
briefed, a court would apply the Gunwall criteria to determine if state
protection extended beyond federal protection. Second, if state protec-
tion extended beyond the federal minimum, a court would examine
the state constitution independently to determine its scope.
D. Post-Gunwall Decisions
The Washington Supreme Court applied the Gunwall criteria in
State v. Boland.47 In Boland, Port Townsend police obtained evidence
of drug activity from the defendant's garbage without a warrant.48
Because the United States Supreme Court found this type of warrant-
less intrusion constitutional in California v. Greenwood,4 9 the issue in
Boland turned on whether the Washington State Constitution afforded
greater protection than the federal Constitution.
Application of the six Gunwall criteria indicated that the federal
constitutional threshold was surpassed. The Boland court cited to and
explicitly adopted the Gunwall court's analysis of criteria one, two,
three, and five.50 Regarding the fourth criterion, consideration of pre-
existing state law, the Boland court looked to local ordinances requir-
ing placement of garbage cans in a closed container on the curb.
These ordinances suggested that only garbage collectors would handle
44. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 58, 720 P.2d at 811.
45. Id. at 62, 720 P.2d at 813.
46. Id. at 62-63, 720 P.2d at 813. Admittedly, the court's approach could be termed
conservative rather than ambitious- in that it would deviate from federal precedent only when
certain conditions were met. In theory, however, counsel would argue state constitutional law in
each and every constitutional case.
47. 115 Wash. 2d 571, 800 P.2d 1112 (1990).
48. Id. at 573, 800 P.2d at 1113.
49. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
50. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d at 576, 800 P.2d at 1114. See supra text accompanying note 44.
1105
Washington Law -Review
the trash, thus implying a privacy interest. 51 Turning to the sixth cri-
terion, matters of local interest, the Boland court noted that because
Greenwood authorized a broader interpretation under state constitu-
tions,5 2 and because other states had found a state constitutional right
to privacy,5 3 Washington was entitled to do the same.5 4 The dissent in
Boland objected to the majority's analysis of factors four and six, argu-
ing that the analysis was neither reasoned nor reasonable.55 To be
sure, the majority's findings on the fourth and sixth criteria did not
provide a strong argument in favor of independently invoking the state
constitution.5 6
The Boland court nonetheless concluded that the Washington State
Constitution could provide broader protection than the federal Consti-
tution, and it next turned to independent analysis of the state constitu-
tion. The court first noted that analysis of protections afforded by
article 1, section 7 hinged on the state's intrusion into a person's "pri-
vate affairs" rather than on the federal "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy" test.5 7 The Boland court began to forge a definition of "private
affairs" by exploring earlier efforts to define what constitutes an
unconstitutional intrusion on a person's private affairs.5 8 Rather than
looking to the intrusion on the defendant's private affairs that
occurred when the police picked through defendant's garbage, how-
ever, the court stated that "average persons would find it reasonable to
believe the garbage they place in their trash cans will be protected
from warrantless governmental intrusion." 59 The court thus retreated
from its own mission to interpret police conduct under state law and
instead relied on the federal "reasonable expectation of privacy" stan-
dard. The court nonetheless concluded that the search fell within the
definition of a "private affair,"'  and was illegal under the state
constitution.
51. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d at 576, 800 P.2d at 1114-15.
52. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988).
53. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d at 576-77, 800 P.2d at 1115 (citing People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357,
486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971), vacated and remanded, 409 U.S. 33 (1972), reaff'd 8
Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521, cert. denied, 412 U.S. 919 (1973); State v. Tanaka,
67 Haw. 658, 701 P.2d 1274 (1985); Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1973)).
54. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d at 577, 800 P.2d at 1115.
55. Id. at 587, 800 P.2d at 1120 (Guy, J., dissenting).
56. See infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
57. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d at 577, 800 P.2d at 1115.
58. Id. at 577-78, 800 P.2d at 1115-16.
59. Id. at 578, 800 P.2d at 1116.
60. Id.
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Boland is one of very few opinions that have cited and adopted the
Gunwall criteria. 61 Despite the clear directions set forth in Gunwall,
use of the six criteria has been neither consistent nor common since
the case was published in 1986. Failure of counsel to brief the issues
according to the Gunwall criteria is the main explanation. 2 Without
briefing on Gunwall, the Washington Supreme Court appears unwill-
ing to apply the approach outlined in Gunwall.63
In some constitutional cases the Washington Supreme Court
appears to extend protection beyond the federal level, yet fails to apply
the Gunwall criteria.6 An example is State v. Leach,65 a search and
seizure case in which the Washington Supreme Court looked to state
constitutional law to conclude that third party consent is not valid
when persons being searched are not given the chance to indicate
opposition to a search despite their immediate presence.66 No federal
case was directly on point, indicating that one reason the Giunwall cri-
teria were not applied was that the Washington Supreme Court will
not compare federal and state constitutional limits without direct fed-
eral precedent to the contrary.
II. PROPOSAL TO MODIFY THE GUN WALL APPROACH
A change is needed in Washington constitutional law. As this over-
view of constitutional interpretation since Gunwall indicates, the
Gunwall criteria have not been consistently applied68 and have not
61. Another case is State v. Reece, 110 Wash. 2d 766, 757 P.2d 947 (1989), which held that
the Washington State Constitution did not grant protection to obscenity. Throughout the
remainder of this Comment, reference will be made to Reece in order to demonstrate that Boland
is not an aberration, but rather typical of the problems engendered by Gunwall.
62. The Washington Supreme Court continues to demand that the criteria be cited and
argued. See, eg., City of Seattle v. Webster, 115 Wash. 2d 635, 646 n.19, 802 P.2d 1333, 1340
(1990) (the court chided counsel for failure to use the Gunwall analysis).
63. See, eg., Ford Motor Co. v. Barret, 115 Wash. 2d 556, 800 P.2d 367 (1990). Justice
Utter, long an advocate of invoking the state constitution, nevertheless refused to independently
invoke the state constitution because it was not briefed and argued at the trial court level: 'Trial
courts should have the same opportunity as this court to make fully informed rulings on state
constitutional law issues." Id at 571, 800 P.2d at 375 (Utter, J., concurring).
64. Failing to cite Gunwall without explanation leaves a majority opinion open to attack. See,
eg., Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wash. 2d 636, 771 P.2d 711 (1989) (in dissent to a holding
that article I, section 21 preserves the jury's role in determining damages, Justice Durham
accused the court of extending constitutional protection beyond that afforded by the federal
Constitution without relying on Gunwall and without providing a reason for doing so).
65. 113 Wash. 2d 735, 782 P.2d 1035 (1989).
66. Id. at 744, 782 P.2d at 1040.
67. Of course, counsel in Leach may simply have failed to argue "broader" rights under the
state constitution and instead relied solely on state precedent and state constitutional arguments
in briefs.
68. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
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promoted principled expansion of independent state constitutional
analysis. 69 The goals of Gunwall have thus not been met, and there-
fore the Gunwall framework needs to be modified. This Comment
now examines the failure of Gunwall by analyzing cases in which state
constitutional issues were asserted, and then proposes a better method
of state constitutional analysis that will guarantee the civil liberties
due under the Washington State Constitution.
A. The Gunwall Criteria Do Not Offer a Proper Framework for
Constitutional Analysis
The six criteria outlined in Gunwall7° are a curious mix of interpre-
tive and comparative factors that fail to comprise a proper framework
for constitutional analysis. Normally, the tools a court uses to con-
strue a constitutional issue include plain language (analogous to
Gunwall criteria one and two), framers' intent (analogous to criterion
three), precedent (analogous to criterion four), structural differences
(analogous to criterion five), and moral concerns (analogous to crite-
rion six) 7 1
Although the Gunwall criteria contain all the usual interpretive
tools, only text and structure are viewed comparatively.72 Therefore,
when a Washington court addresses the threshold question whether
the state constitution affords broader rights than the federal Constitu-
tion, it compares only text and structure under Gunwall. Considera-
tion of intent, precedent, and values is directed only to the state
constitution. This does not allow a full comparison of all issues.
When a court views local concerns and values without comparison to
the federal framework, the concerns may be discounted as minor, or
alternately may be exaggerated.73 Intent may similarly be discounted
or conversely inflated when not put in perspective with the intent of
the framers of the United States Constitution.
The Gunwall framework allows a party to assert rights under the
state constitution independently only if application of the six criteria
suggests a broader scope of rights under the state constitution.74 This
threshold at which the state constitution may be invoked indepen-
69. See supra notes 47-60 and accompanying text.
70. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 58, 720 P.2d 808, 811 (1986). See supra text
accompanying note 44.
71. See Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory to Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV.
L. REv. 1189 at 1189-90 (1987).
72. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 61-62, 720 P.2d at 812-13.
73. See infra text accompanying notes 93-97.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
1108
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dently, however, is subject to manipulation.75 To determine if the
scope of protection is greater under the state constitution, a court
should compare plain language, framers' intent, precedent, structure,
and moral values with respect to both constitutions. Under Gunwall,
however, only text and structure are compared. Thus, the goal of
Gunwall to provide a framework under which to compare state and
federal rights is thwarted from the very start.
Further, use of the criteria is patently haphazard. By requiring a
threshold showing that broader rights are afforded under the state
constitution, Gunwall assumes from the outset that the Washington
State Constitution is analogous in all respects to the federal Constitu-
tion as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. Only if this
presumption is rebutted will the Washington Supreme Court indepen-
dently rely on the state constitution. Such deference to the federal
Constitution is not required under principles of federalism76 and com-
promises the fundamental integrity of the state constitution. The pro-
cess of initially assessing analogous protections is haphazard in that if
an issue arises in Washington state that has not been brought before
the United States Supreme Court, Washington courts may analyze the
issue solely under state constitutional law. Once the United States
Supreme Court decides a case, however, Washington is implicitly
bound by it unless the Gunwall criteria can be successfully invoked.
The timing of United States Supreme Court cases should not dictate
state constitutional law, yet this may occur under Gunwall.
An example will demonstrate the haphazard effect of Gunwall. In
State v. Leach 77 the Washington Supreme Court relied on the state
constitution to hold that third party consent to a police search is inva-
lid when the person whose property is searched is not given the oppor-
tunity to object.78 No federal case was directly on point, and the
Leach court did not invoke Gunwall. Shortly after the case was
decided, however, the United States Supreme Court addressed a simi-
lar set of facts in Illinois v. Rodriguez79 and held directly to the
contrary.
Leach is still good law because the Washington Supreme Court
relied on state constitutional grounds. Had Leach arisen after Rodri-
guez, however, the court would have been bound by the United States
Supreme Court's holding unless Gunwall was successfully invoked.
75. See infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 32-38.
77. 113 Wash. 2d 735, 782 P.2d 1035 (1989)
78. Id. at 744, 782 P.2d at 1040.
79. 110 S. Ct. 2793 (1990).
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Use of the Gunwall criteria is thus haphazard in that the timing of
United States Supreme Court decisions can dictate Washington consti-
tutional law.
B. The Gunwall Goal of Promoting State Constitutional Analysis
Has Failed Due to Primary Focus on the Federal
Constitution
The goals of Gunwall were to encourage counsel to brief state con-
stitutional issues and to provide a basis for expansion of independent
state constitutional analysis that would be principled rather than prag-
matic.8 0  This expansion never occurred, 81 and the cases applying
Gunwall are not strong examples of principled decision making. 82 By
directing attention to federal constitutional principles at the threshold
stage of analysis, the Washington courts have become overly depen-
dent on federal precedent. The criteria force courts to focus on federal
constitutional provisions and interpretations, and to invoke state con-
stitutional provisions only to the extent that they afford broader pro-
tection. The Gunwall criteria minimize the possibility that the state
constitution might provide a different and perhaps unique approach to
constitutional interpretation.
For instance, federal and state courts have struggled for years to
define a "reasonable expectation of privacy" regarding unlawful search
and seizures. The Oregon Supreme Court rejected the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" mode of analysis, asserting that "[t]he phrase
becomes a formula for expressing a conclusion rather than a starting
point for analysis, masking the various substantive considerations that
are the real bases on which the Fourth Amendment searches are
defined." 83 Washington also rejected the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test84 in favor of a different and more useful analytical frame-
work. Prior to Gunwall, the Washington courts made great strides in
defining search and seizure rights under the "unreasonable intrusion
into a person's private affairs" standard.85 Since Gunwall, however,
80. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 62-63, 720 P.2d 808, 813 (1986). See supra text
accompanying notes 45-46.
81. Even where Gun wall was applied and a broader scope of rights acknowledged, the Court
failed to add substance to state constitutional interpretation. See infra text accompanying notes
86-91.
82. See infra text accompanying notes 93-97.
83. State v. Campbell, 306 Or. 157, 759 P.2d 1040, 1044 (1988).
84. See, e.g., State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 510, 688 P.2d 151, 153-54 (1984).
85. See, e.g., Nock, Seizing Opportunity, Searching for Theory: Article I Section 7, 8 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 331 (1985) (article traces the development of Washington courts'
interpretation of article I, section 7).
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courts have made little progress in advancing this standard because
once a court views the state constitution in the shadow of the federal
Constitution, it is difficult to view the state constitution with a fresh
perspective.
Boland is a prime example of this tendency. Even though the initial
threshold was surpassed and the court independently invoked the
Washington State Constitution, federal rationales invaded the Wash-
ington Supreme Court's reasoning.86 Numerous cases prior to
Gunwall contributed to the definition of "private affairs,""7 and the
Court recognized that the proper inquiry in Washington focuses on
unreasonable intrusion into a person's "private affairs." 88 Yet the
court concluded that an intrusion into a person's private affairs
occurred because "average persons would find it reasonable to believe
the garbage they place in their trash cans will be protected from war-
rantless government intrusion." 9 The court in the same breath
rejected the expectation of privacy test as counter to Washington law,
and then again embraced it.9" Such inconsistencies result from
Gunwall because once attention focuses on federal precedent and ter-
minology, courts find it hard to turn back to state law and invoke
independent, creative analysis of state constitutional provisions.91
As a practical matter, the federal Constitution need only be
examined after analysis of the state constitution to ensure that the
minimum level of federal constitutional rights is sustained.92 Of
course, federal precedent serves as persuasive authority in many
instances and reference to federal authority reveals substantive differ-
ences between the constitutions. Gunwall, however, forces unneces-
86. See supra text accompanying notes 57-60.
87. See cases cited supra note 21.
88. State v. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 577, 800 P.2d 1112, 1115 (1990).
89. IM/ at 578, 800 P.2d at 1116.
90. Emphasis on federal precedent also occurred in State v. Reece, 110 Wash. 2d 766, 757
P.2d 947 (1988). The Reece court turned its back on Article I, § 5 of the state constitution which
provides for free speech on "all subjects" in favor of federal rationales: "We hold that if a
publication meets the federal test as an obscenity, it may be banned under both the state and
federal constitutions." Ida at 776, 757 P.2d at 953.
91. But see Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Comment on Federal
Constitutional Issues when Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds, 63 TEx. L. REv.
1027 (1989). Washington Supreme Court Justice Utter makes a convincing argument for the
value of analyzing state constitutional issues parallel to federal law. To the extent that
comparison is free from the implicit applicability of the federal constitution to Washington
constitutional law, the opinion expressed in this Comment does not differ from Justice Utter's.
Federal case law has value as persuasive authority and serves to delineate differences between
state and federal constitutions. Gunwall, however, goes beyond this and proceeds from the
assumption that the state and federal constitutions initially provide the same rights.
92. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
1111
Washington Law Review
sary and inadvisable emphasis on federal precedent, and this hampers
the growth of Washington state constitutional law.
C. Application of Gunwall in Boland Shows that the Criteria Can
Serve as a Mask for Ad Hoc Decision Making
Application of the six Gunwall criteria in Boland suggests that the
criteria do not foster principled decision making. The Boland court's
treatment of the Gunwall criteria constitutes a weak argument in favor
of a broader scope of rights under the state constitution. First, the
Washington Supreme Court seems to mix reasoning with result in its
examination of matters of local interest. In support of the defendant's
assertion of a privacy interest in garbage, the Boland court cited the
results of other state court decisions that found a constitutional right
to privacy in garbage,93 but failed to articulate the basis upon which
the other state courts reached that conclusion.94 In effect, the Boland
court's rationale is that because other states recognize a privacy inter-
est in garbage, Washington can also. The Boland court fails to address
how this supports a particularly local interest. The holding thus has
the appearance of ad hoc decision making.
A second weakness of Boland attributable to reliance on Gunwall is
the analysis of preexisting state law. The majority in Boland stressed
the fact that both Port Townsend and Seattle have municipal ordi-
nances regulating placement of garbage cans on the curb.9 5 The court
reasoned that this supports an expectation that only trash collectors
will collect a person's trash, and accordingly a local interest existed
sufficient to interpret the state constitution independently. 96 This con-
clusion is somewhat simplistic. Hypothetically, if Seattle or Port
Townsend were to repeal or amend their municipal ordinances, would
doubt be cast on the validity of the extension of constitutional protec-
tion to individuals' garbage? Perhaps the court is asserting that the
average person's expectations are likely to be formed by such ordi-
nances, but an assertion that reasonable persons are aware of trash
codes and form their expectation of privacy based on these codes is not
93. State v. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 578, 800 P.2d 1112, 1116 (1990) (citing State v.
Tanaka, 67 Haw. 658, 701 P.2d 1274 (1985)).
94. This did not go unnoticed by the dissent: "If we are to rely upon other states' treatment
of this issue, then the overwhelming majority of courts have held to the contrary." Boland, 115
Wash. 2d at 586, 800 P.2d at 1120 (Guy, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 576, 800 P.2d at 1114.
96. Id. at 576, 800 P.2d at 1115.
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persuasive. Reliance on preexisting statutory law does not make a
strong argument in favor of a constitutional privacy interest. 97
A stronger argument in favor of extending constitutional protection
to warrantless searches of garbage can be formulated based entirely on
the Washington State Constitution. Other Washington cases, includ-
ing cases noted by the Boland court, have defined privacy interests in a
variety of contexts including a jail property box,9 8 the locked trunk of
a car,99 a locked container in a private vehicle,"°° and a person's right
not to be indiscriminately stopped at police roadblocks.101 These
examples suggest that a "private affairs" interest may be defined as a
matter or object personal to an individual such that intruding upon it
would offend a reasonable person.102 This definition would arguably
cover garbage placed on the curb for collection because discarded
items such as cancelled checks, letters, and bills contain personal
information an individual would likely intend to remain strictly per-
sonal. This definition would provide a workable framework from
which to expand state constitutional analysis in future cases.
In short, the Gunwall criteria are not conducive to strong constitu-
tional analysis. Manipulation is possible when the criteria are applied
to the threshold issue of whether the state constitution extends
broader protection. This manipulation typifies the type of analysis the
Gunwall court intended to avoid.10 3
D. Toward True Independent Analysis of the Washington State
Constitution
L Reliance on Washington's Unique Constitutional Heritage
Washington state courts should rely on Washington's unique consti-
tutional heritage. The Gunwall approach is a step toward independent
97. Boland is not the only instance of misplaced reliance on statutory law. In State v. Reece,
110 Wash. 2d 766, 757 P.2d 947 (1988), the dissent noted that "[the fundamental strength of the
constitution is that it forces us, having declared basic principles, to apply those principles
uniformly, even if such a result may not be popular in some instances and even where we must
nullify a statute." Id. at 790, 757 P.2d at 960 (Utter, J., dissenting).
98. State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980).
99. State v. Houser, 95 Wash. 2d 143, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980).
100. State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986).
101. State v. Mesiani, 110 Wash._2d 454, 755 P.2d 775 (1988).
102. In State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 688 P.2d 151 (1984), the court framed the issue as
whether it was "unreasonably intrusive" for police to view defendant's property from the air. Id
at 514, 688 P.2d at 155.
103. See State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 58, 720 P.2d 808, 813 (1986). "Recourse to our
state constitution as an independent source for recognizing and protecting the individual rights of
our citizens must spring not from pure intuition, but from a process that is at once articulable,
reasonable and reasoned." L at 63, 720 P.2d at 818.
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state constitutional analysis because the criteria force attorneys and
courts to consider the state constitution. For the reasons set forth
above, however, Gunwall has done little to promote principled analysis
of the Washington State Constitution. Gunwall requires a detour to
the federal Constitution that obscures the fact that the Washington
State Constitution is in itself a complete embodiment of civil
liberties.'04
The structure of the Washington State Constitution is unique.10
The state government is compelled to provide for basic needs, giving
Washington citizens "positive constitutional rights" to assert against
the state when the state fails in its duty to supply education and other
enumerated services.10 6 Moreover, the state government must furnish
educational benefits to all persons "without distinction or preference
on account of race, color, caste, or sex." 107 Not only is equal protec-
tion guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution, but the Washington State Constitution also forces the
state government to provide equal protection with respect to educa-
tional services. This suggests that the citizen-state relationship created
by the Washington State Constitution is distinct from that of the fed-
eral Constitution. It follows that state government in Washington is
subject to constitutional constraints absent at the federal level. There-
fore, the state constitution should be examined independently in all
"rights" cases to ascertain whether the state has met the state constitu-
tional mandate.
As noted, historical evidence suggests that in several areas, the
framers of the Washington State Constitution purposely chose word-
ing that differed from the federal Constitution in order to protect a
broader scope of civil rights. " Until recently, these differences went
unnoticed, 0 9 and under Gunwall they remain undeveloped. Using
intent as an analytic tool is criticized as protecting inflexibility and
104. WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 1-32.
105. The Washington State Constitution is unique in comparison to the federal Constitution.
Other state constitutions may have similar provisions.
106. See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. XIII (mandating provision of educational, reformatory,
and penal institutions) and WASH. CONST. art. IX (mandating public schools).
107. WASH. CONsT. art. IX, § 1.
108. The Journal of the Washington State Constitutional Convention, supra note 31 at 497.
109. See, e.g., Nock, Seizing Opportunity, Searching for Theory: Article I, Section 7 8 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 331 (1985). The author notes, in comparing the fourth amendment and
article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution, that "[t]hese two passages have exactly
five words in common: no, be, in, or, of Yet, wondrously, courts have interpreted the provisions
as identical in nearly all important respects, and the areas of divergence have had little to do with
textual differences." Id. at 331.
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societal ideals that are no longer valid,11° but where the framers' intent
was to broaden the civil liberties of Washington citizens, courts must
not ignore this intent. The intent of the framers to use the state consti-
tution to protect civil liberties beyond the level explicitly provided in
the federal Constitution compels Washington state courts to examine
the state constitution independently in all situations, not only when
the threshold stage of Gunwall has been surpassed.
Additional protection of individual freedom in Washington results
from inclusion of a clause in the state constitution encouraging a
"recurrence to fundamental principles." '111 The federal Constitution
contains no such provision, and the original intent of including this
provision is not clear. One may suppose, however, that the principles
the framers had in mind were the natural rights embodied in the previ-
ous thirty-one sections. Supporting this assertion is section 29, which
makes the provisions of the state constitution mandatory. Section 32
does not direct attention to the federal Constitution or to some other
source of rights, but rather to the fundamental principles embodied in
the Washington State Constitution. For the Washington Supreme
Court to look elsewhere defies the intent of the framers of the state
constitution.
2. Continued Gunwall Analysis Will Compromise the Civil Liberties
Due Washington Residents
Reliance on Gunwall compromises the civil liberties provided by the
Washington State Constitution. Nothing compels state courts to begin
constitutional analysis with the presumption that federal holdings bind
them. Courts are bound to uphold only the minimum federal constitu-
tional floor. 12 Yet Gunwall forces attention first and foremost to the
110. See generally Schlag, Framers Intent. The Illegitimate Uses of History, 8 U. PUGET
SOuND L. REv. 283 (1985).
111. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 32. Little scholarship is available regarding the meaning of this
section. It is cited chiefly in dissenting opinions. See, eg., State v. Reece, 110 Wash. 2d 766, 790,
757 P.2d 947, 960 (1988); State v. McCollum, 17 Wash. 2d 85, 136 P.2d 165 (1943), rev'd sub
nom, State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983). In a particularly enlightening
dissent, Justice Milland wrote:
The founding fathers were aware of the ills to which a republican form of government is
peculiarly heir. They were mindful of the fact that a free people too soon forget the fathers'
sacrifices which made the heritage of liberty possible, and that, through the years as they
prosper, the people grow more indifferent to and heedless of, the fundamental principles of
government and fall an easy prey to the slow and insidious encroachment from within upon
natural and constitutional rights.
McCollum, 17 Wash. 2d at 95, 136 P.2d at 169 (Milland, J., dissenting).
112. The Washington Supreme Court itself asserts the right to independently interpret its
own constitution, yet curiously begins with federal constitutional analysis. See, e.g., Reece, 110
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assumed applicability of the federal interpretation to Washington state
law. This order of analysis threatens the broader civil liberties
afforded under the Washington State Constitution. Civil liberties
retrenchment at the federal level should not necessarily dictate Wash-
ington constitutional protections, but the Gunwall analysis promotes
that result by forcing attention to the federal Constitution.
State courts are often viewed by the United States Supreme Court as
laboratories for the development of legal issues." 3 The "states as lab-
oratories" view took on new meaning when attention turned to state
constitutions as separate and complete sources of civil rights. The
United States Supreme Court has authorized state courts to go beyond
the minimum floor provided by the federal Constitution114 and may
even be reserving judgment in some cases for the sole purpose of
allowing states to decide issues based on state law." 5 For example,
Justice Marshall, in a bitter dissent to a decision not to grant certiorari
in a case where an all-white jury sentenced an African American to
death after the prosecution used peremptory challenges to exclude
black jurors, accused the majority of reticence in leaving to the states
an issue that demanded attention.16 If the United States Supreme
Court is indeed leaving some issues to the states, the states should
assume responsibility for resolving those issues under their own laws
and own constitutions. To the extent that Gunwall focuses primary
attention on federal constitutional law, the time is right to drop
Gunwall and forge ahead with independent analysis of the Washington
State Constitution.
3. Modifying the Gunwall Analysis
The Gunwall framework must be modified to promote principled
decision making based on the Washington State Constitution. The
Gunwall court expressed its desire to avoid substituting its conception
of justice for that of the United States Supreme Court."17 Hesitancy to
Wash. 2d at 770, 757 P.2d at 950 ("In beginning our analysis with federal law, we do not retreat
from our general position that in resolving a constitutional law question we should turn first to
the provisions of our own state constitution.") The Reece court nonetheless proceeds to discuss
federal law before state law. Id. at 770-71, 757 P.2d at 950.
113. This metaphor was first used in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11
(1932).
114. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988).
115. Of course, such issues have been directed to state courts without specific reference to
state constitutional law, but when United States Supreme Court opinions encourage states to
evaluate civil rights issues under state law, the "states as laboratories" rationale encompasses
state constitutional law.
116. Gilliard v. Mississippi, 464 U.S. 867 (1983).
117. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 63, 720 P.2d 808, 813 (1986).
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expand constitutional rights haphazardly is understandable. A state's
highest court must strive to follow legal principles rather than fall prey
to political or emotional forces, but political and emotional forces also
batter the United States Supreme Court.11 Following federal prece-
dent will not in itself foster principled decision making. The solution
is to discard the assumption that the state constitution should be inter-
preted as the United States Supreme Court interprets the federal Con-
stitution, and focus instead on Washington's unique constitutional
heritage. 119
The framework of Gunwall should be modified in favor of a three-
step process. First, constitutional issues, including textual, structural,
and intent arguments should be asserted under the Washington State
Constitution. Second, state constitutional and common law precedent
should be considered, along with the persuasive authority of other
state and federal courts. Finally, a court must ensure that its decision
upholds the minimum level of civil liberties ensured by the federal
Constitution. This method of constitutional interpretation would help
attain the goals of Gunwall. It would direct counsel to cite the state
constitution with comparative reference to the federal Constitution,
and development of state constitutional law would occur in a princi-
pled manner.
III. CONCLUSION
Despite the laudable intent of the Washington Supreme Court to
interpret the state constitution in a principled manner, little growth in
state constitutional law has occurred in the years since the Gunwall
decision. This lack of growth is due to the analytical framework estab-
lished by GunwalL Focus on federal constitutional law at the initial
stage as required by Gunwall taints a court's perspective with federal
analysis, and Washington's unique and vital constitutional heritage
becomes obscured. Further, application of the six Gunwall criteria
forces courts to twist their reasoning to conform to a preconceived
notion. The weakness of the Boland holding is merely one example.
In order to realize the goals of Gunwall, its structure must be aban-
118. See ag., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 213
(1989) ("It is a sad commentary upon American life, and constitutional principles-so full of late
of patriotic fervor and proud proclamations about 'liberty and justice for all-'that this child,
Joshua DeShaney, now is assigned to live out the remainder of his life profoundly retarded.")
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
119. Those who fear that departure from federal precedent will cause an explosion of civil
rights at the expense of police protection should read Utter, State Constitutional Law, the United
States Supreme Court, and Democratic Accountability: Is There a Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64
WASH. L. REv. 19 (1989).
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doned and courts' attention must be directed first and foremost to the
state constitution. Federal precedent has a role as persuasive author-
ity, but it need not and should not dominate Washington courts' anal-
ysis. Increased attention on Washington's unique constitutional
heritage will guarantee the civil liberties due to Washington citizens
under their state constitution.
James W. Talbot
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